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SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL -
DELAY OF OVER TWO YEARS BETWEEN INITIAL 
ARREST AND TRIAL NOT PREJUDICIAL TO 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR AND SPEEDY TRIAL. 
State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544, cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 841 (1990). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Bailey,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a split 
decision, affirmed a drug conviction handed down over two years 
after the defendant's initial arrest. In a liberal application of existing 
precedent, the court reasoned that "the peculiar circumstances of 
this case . . . were sufficient to outweigh . . . any prejudice, actual 
and presumed, arising from the length of the delay."i In light of 
Bailey, this Case note will examine how defendants in Maryland will 
have to provide convincing evidence of actual prejudice if they are 
to be successful when challenging convictions on grounds of pre-trial 
delay. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial . . .. "3 Similar language appears in 
article 21 of the Maryland Constitution,4 and statutory protections 
l. 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 841 (1990). 
2. [d. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
4. Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution provides: 
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be 
informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the 
Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to prepare for his 
defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses 
for and against him on oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial 
jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found 
guilty. 
MD. CONST. art. 2l. 
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are provided under both federalS and state law. 6 The Supreme Court 
has stated that this is a fundamental righF imposed on the states by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 
The Due Process Clause itself provides additional protection of 
an accused's right to a fair trial9 and is frequently invoked as an 
alternative remedy when pre-trial delays are. involved. lO Defendants 
5. Federal protections are provided in the Speedy Trial Act which states: "In any 
case involving a defendant charged with an offense, the appropriate judicial 
officer, at the earliest practicable time, shall ... set the case for trial on a 
day certain ... so as to assure a speedy trial." Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161(a) (1990). 
6. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1992), which provides: 
(a) The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court: 
(1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of: 
(i) The appearance of counsel; or 
(ii) The first appearance of the defendant before the circuit 
court, as provided in the Maryland Rules; and 
(2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those 
events. 
(b) On motion of a party or on the court's initiative and for good 
cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that 
judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date. 
(c) The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of practice and 
procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit courts. 
See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1990) (court must order dismissal if 
there is no indictment within 15 days or trial does not commence in a Superior 
Court within 60 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1980 
& Supp. 1992) (every person in custody shall be tried within 120 days; if out 
on bail or recognizance, within 160 days); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.556 
(Michie 1992) (court may dismiss complaint if no indictment filed within 15 
days; trial must occur within 60 days of the indictment); VA. CODE ANN. § 
19.2-243 (Michie 1990) (where general district court finds probable cause of a 
felony, case will be discharged if no trial is commenced within five months, 
or nine months if defendant is not held in custody). 
7. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 & n.2 (1972) (quoting Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967». 
8. Barker, 470 U.S. at 515; see also Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222-23 (relying on 
holding in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), that Sixth Amendment 
protections apply to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
9. The due process provisions of the Constitution are especially important pro-
tections against pre-indictment delay. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person 
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... "); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... OJ). 
10. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (invoking Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause where delay of three years between indictment and 
alleged illegal activity substantially prejudiced appellee's right to a fair trial); 
see also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (stating that undue 
delay after charges are dismissed may be examined under the Due Process 
Clause); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226-27 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (stating preference to decide case by relying on Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than on the speedy trial provision of the 
Sixth Amendment). 
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may petition the courts for relief under this provision when the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee has not attached or is inapplicable. II 
Earlier in this century, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
right to a speedy trial relates to the context and the circumstances 
surrounding the case and "the rights of public justice." 12 The right 
is unusual in that it serves interests of society which may, at times, 
be in opposition to those of the accused.13 For example, a delay in 
bringing an accused to trial may actually work to his advantage if 
the state's case largely depends on a witness who may become 
unavailable with the passage of time. For this reason, delay is often 
used as a defense tactic, and deprivation of the right is not considered 
per se prejudicial to the accused's ability to adequately defend 
himself. 14 Because the Sixth Amendment guarantee is itself indicative 
that delay is often detrimental to the defendant, any "purposeful or 
oppressive" prosecutorial delay which is used to harass or hamper 
the defense is considered improper and invokes the constitutional 
protections. IS 
The right to a speedy trial is also different from other consti-
tutional rights because it is "impossible to pinpoint a precise time in 
the process when the right must be asserted."16 Consequently, it is 
"impossible to determine with [any] precision when the right has 
[actually] been denied."17 Thus, an accurate assessment of a speedy 
trial claim depends not on some bright line rule but necessitates an 
inquir:Y into the context of each particular case and set of circum-
stances. IS 
Although the speedy trial provision is a single constitutionally-
granted shield, it protects at least three separate but related interests 
of the defendant: (1) avoiding undue and oppressive pretrial incar-
ceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern brought on by public 
accusation; and (3) limiting the possibility that delay will restrict the 
accused's ability to effectively defend himself.19 The Supreme Court 
has recognized these defense interests as the standards by which 
prejudice is measured when a prosecutorial delay occurs. 20 
. The right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Constitution 
11. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. 
12. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905). 
13. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). 
14. [d. at 521. 
15. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957). 
16. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527. 
17. [d. at 521. 
18. [d. at 522. 
19. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); see John C. Godbold, Speedy 
Trial - Major Surgery for a National III, 24 ALA. L. REV. 265, 268-72 (1972). 
20. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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has been considered most notably in the context of delays during the 
following periods: (1) between arrest and indictment;21 (2) after 
indictment but prior to trial;22 (3) after trial but prior to sentencing;23 
and (4) prior to retrial.24 In Bailey, the situation involved somewhat 
different circumstances in that the delay resulted from the dismissal 
of the initial indictment and a subsequent reindictment. This unusual 
set of circumstances was due to a combination of the defendant's 
criminal conviction in another jurisdiction and the state's desire to 
enhance its case by gathering evidence for additional charges.2s 
In 1971, the Supreme Court clarified when the "speedy trial 
clock" begins to tick. The Court reasoned in United States v. 
Marion26 that the speedy trial provision has no application until the 
"defendant in some way became an accused. "27 The right thus 
attaches at the time of arrest or upon the filing of formal charges, 
whichever comes first. 28 Ten years later, in MacDonald v. United 
States,29 the Court held that the defendant loses "accused" status 
once charges are formally dropped.30 Once charges have been dropped 
in good faith, the speedy trial provision has no further application 
until a reindictment. 31 Any delay occurring after such a dismissal, 
and any remedy for such a delay, are considered under a due process 
analysis rather than the Speedy Trial ClauseY If the prosecution 
21. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (two year delay between 
arrest and indictment). 
22. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (holding that aggregate delay 
of 22 months between arrest and indictment and 12 months between indictment 
and trial was violative of defendant's right to a speedy trial). 
23. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957) (two year delay between 
trial and sentencing). 
24. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 219-21 (1967) (holding that state 
may not, without stated justification, indefinitely postpone reprosecution on 
an indictment over the objection of an accused who has been discharged from 
custody after a mistrial in the first prosecution). 
25. See infra note 81 and accompanying text. 
26. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). 
27. [d. at 313. 
28. [d. at 320. 
29. 456 U.S. 1 (1982). 
30. [d. at 8. Although MacDonald is similar to Bailey in that the charges against 
both defendants were dropped, the MacDonald holding was considered and 
distinguished by the court of special appeals. Bailey v. State, No. 88-737, slip 
op. at 4-5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989) [available on microfiche as 
part of the record extract filed with the briefs for· the appeal to the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990) (No. 
89-75)]. Unlike in Bailey, however, the prosecution in MacDonald had no case 
with which to move forward. The court of appeals evidently accepted this 
rationale because the issue was not raised again. 
31. [d. at 7 & n.7. 
32. /d. at 7. Note, however, that Bailey was decided primarily on a Sixth Amend-
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drops charges with an improper motive, however, the speedy trial 
right continues to apply. 33 
Just six months after Marion, the United States Supreme Court 
in Barker v. Wingo34 established a test to analyze the denial of the 
right to a speedy trial. For the first time, the Court set the "criteria 
by which the speedy trial right is to be judged. "35 In establishing 
this criteria, the Court rejected two alternative approaches commonly 
applied in the past: (1) trial required within a specified time period 
and (2) a "demand/waiver" approach whereby a prior demand for 
a speedy trial was a necessary condition to the consideration of the 
right.36 Because the Constitution does not specify a definite time 
period for bringing an accused to trial, the Court reasoned that the 
first approach went beyond the constitutional requirements. 37 In 
rejecting the latter approach, the Court reasoned that it would be 
inconsistent with prior decisions to presume "waiver by inaction" of 
a fundamental constitutional right. 38 
The Court established the following four-part balancing test: (1) 
"the length of the delay;"(2) "the reason for the delay;" (3) '''the 
defendant's assertion of his right;" and (4) "prejudice to the defen-
dant. "39 The Court made clear the importance and desirability of 
implementing a test that weighed the conduct and assertions of both 
the prosecution and the accused40 and suggested that this test be 
applied on an "ad hoc basis."41 
Although an important factor in the analysis, prior decisions 
establish that the length of the delay is not exclusively determinative 
of whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated. A delay as 
long as five years has been allowed42 while a time period as short as 
one year and fifteen days has been deemed a violation of the right.43 
Significantly, Barker proclaims that the length of the delay acts as a 
ment speedy trial basis even though Bailey raised the due process issue both 
on appeal to the court of special appeals and to the court of appeals. Although 
the court of special appeals did not address the due process issue, the court 
of appeals held that actual prejudice must exist for the Due Process Clause to 
take hold. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392,420, 572 A.2d 544, 557, cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 841 (1990). 
33. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972). 
34. [d. at 514. 
35. /d. at 516. 
36. [d. at 529-30. See id. at 522-28 for a general discussion and comparison of 
the two approaches. 
37. [d. at 529. 
38. [d. at 525. 
39. [d. at 530. 
40. [d. 
41. [d. 
42. The delay in Barker was more than five years between arrest and trial. 
43. Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975) (defendant was arrested August 
9, 1972, indicted September 25, 1972, and tried August 22, 1973). 
160 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
"triggering mechanism;"44 once the length of the delay reaches a 
constitutional dimension, a presumption of prejudice arises and the 
remaining factors of the balancing test are applied.45 
In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly adopted a statutory 
prompt trial provision that is currently codified in article 27, section 
591, of the Maryland Annotated Code.46 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland later adopted Maryland Rule 74647 to make mandatory the 
prompt trial provisions of section 591,48 which had previously been 
construed' as only directory.49 The time limits imposed by these 
provisions50 are not, however, the measure of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a speedy trial;51 the provisions were enacted primarily to 
protect society's interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases.52 
Neither section 591 nor rule 746 confer any benefit on the accused 
beyond those already granted by the federal constitution. 53 In fact, 
44. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
45. [d. 
46. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1992); see supra note 6 and accompanying 
text. 
47. Maryland Rule 746 is now Maryland Rule 4-271. 
48. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). The Hicks court 
explained: 
By our adoption of Rule 746 in 1977, we intended to supersede the 
provisions of § 591(a) and put teeth into a new regulation governing 
the assignment of criminal cases for trial. We did so pursuant to the 
authority vested in the Court by Article IV, § 18(a) of the Constitution 
of Maryland to make rules having the force of law governing "practice 
and procedure in and the administration of the . . . courts." .... 
The provisions of Rule 746 are of mandatory application, binding 
upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are not mere guides or 
bench marks to be observed, if convenient. 
[d.; see also State v. Cook, 322 Md. 93, 95-96, 585 A.2d 833, 834 (1991) 
("The dictates of the rule and the statute which it implemented are generally 
known as the Hicks Rule. "). 
49. See Hicks, 285 Md. at 316, 403 A.2d at 359 (citing Young v. State, 15 Md. 
App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, aiI'd, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467 (1972». 
50. Section 591 provides that, absent a showing of "good cause" for postponement, 
a criminal defendant must be tried within 180 days from his or his counsel's 
first court appearance. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591(a), (b) (1992). As 
originally enacted, the statute required "extraordinary cause" for postpone-
ment; the standard was changed to "good cause" in 1980. See State v. Glenn, 
53 Md. App. 717; 724, 456 A.2d 1300, 1303-04 (1983). Rule 4-271 provides 
that within 30 days of the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first 
appearance of the defendant before the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213, 
a trial date within 180 days of that triggering event is to be set. MD. R. 4-
271(a)(1). For a more in-depth discussion of Maryland's "prompt trial provi-
sions," see Harold D. Norton, Maryland's Prompt Criminal Trial Provisions: 
Hicks and Beyond, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 447 (1985). 
51. Hicks, 285 Md. at 320, 403 A.2d at 361. 
52. See Hicks, 285 Md. at 316-17, 320,403 A.2d at 359-61. 
53. See, e.g., Hicks, 285 Md. at 320, 403 A.2d at 361-62 ("[In finding defendant's 
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the Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated specifically that "the 
statute and rule were not meant to supersede the constitutional rights 
to a speedy trial .... "54 
Maryland has therefore adopted the Barker analysis and balanc-
ing test when considering the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy 
tria1. 55 Prior to Bailey, the most extensive application of Barker by 
the COlirt of Appeals of Maryland was in Brady v. State56 decided 
in 1981. In Brady, the court of appeals held that the defendant, 
whose prosecution was delayed fourteen months, was denied his right 
to a speedy trial because of the prosecution's negligence. The delay 
resulted from the State's inability to find Brady, although he was 
located somewhere within the state correctional system itself. This 
reason for the delay, deemed "prosecutorial indifference" by the 
court, was the determining factor in the court's decision to reverse 
Brady's conviction.57 
III. THE INSTANT CASE 
Alex Bailey (aka James Vron) was arrested on February 14, 
1986, in Montgomery County, Maryland, and charged with violation 
incarceration in Delaware to constitute cause to justify a postponement], we 
intend no departure from the established law that the mere fact that a defendant 
is incarcerated in another jurisdiction does not relieve the State of its Sixth 
Amendment obligation to grant the accused his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial. "). 
54. State v. Cook, 322 Md. 93, 96, 585 A.2d 833, 834 (1991). 
55. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 281 Md. 640, 382 A.2d 1053 (finding no violation 
of defendant's right to speedy trial despite the fact that hearing on the 
defendant's motion to dismiss did not take place until four years after his 
arrest, as defendant was in custody of the State of Maryland only 10 of those 
days and was incarcerated in other jurisdictions during the remainder of the 
period of delay; the prejudice resulting to the defendant was minimal; the 
defendant acted affirmatively to delay the trial; and there was little in the way 
of assertion by the defendant of his right to a speedy trial), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 839 (1978); Jones v. State, 279 Md. I, 367 A.2d 1 (1976) (reversing 
conviction where prejudice resulted from 29 month delay from arrest until 
trial), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977); Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 350 A.2d 
640 (1976) (finding that inadvertent five year delay between conviction and 
sentencing, although attributable to the State, did not prejudice defendant who 
failed to assert his right to a speedy trial; defendant was .not incarcerated 
during this period, and may have benefited from the delay in view of the fact 
that he was put on probation when he was finally sentenced); Smith v. State, 
276 Md. 521, 350 A.2d 628 (1976) (overturning conviction after prejudicial 16 
month delay between arrest and trial; delays were attributable to the State and 
defendant had adequately asserted his right); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345 
A.2d 62 (1975) (reversing conviction where delay was due to tactics of prose-
cutor and subsequent illness of arresting officer, and defendant's alibi witness 
became unavailable due to the delay). 
56. 291 Md. 261, 434 A.2d 574 (1981). 
57. [d. at 269, 434 A.2d at 578. 
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of the Controlled Dangerous Substance Act. 58 He was subsequently 
indicted by a grand jury on March 20, 1986, on charges of distri-
bution of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.59 In May of 1986, the State learned 
that Bailey was convicted in absentia in South Carolina on April 8, 
1985, of possession with intent to distribute valium and trafficking 
in cocaine, for which he received a sentence of ten years. 60 
Upon learning of this conviction, the Maryland prosecutor en-
tered a nolle prosequi as to the Maryland drug charges in order to 
allow South Carolina to enroll and execute its conviction.61 The nolle 
prosequi was entered on June 6, 1986.62 Bailey returned to South 
Carolina in June, appeared in Charleston County Court on October 
16, and on October 22 began serving the previously imposed ten-
year sentence. 63 
In Maryland, the grand jury returned a new indictment against 
Bailey on May 28, 1987. This indictment included the earlier charge 
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, plus a new count of 
58. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 397, 572 A.2d 544, 546, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
841 (1990). For a complete chronology of events between this date and the 
trial in February 1988, see id. at 399-402, 572 A.2d at 547-48. 
59. [d. at 399, 572 A.2d at 547. 
60. Bailey was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine in Charleston 
County, South Carolina on September 5, 1984. On April 8, 1985, he was tried 
in absentia (TIA) and found guilty, with a 10 year sentence imposed. [d. at 
399, 572 A.2d at 547. 
61. In a letter of June 3, 1986, the Assistant State's Attorney informed the defense 
counsel as follows: 
I have recently been informed by the Solicitor's Office in Charles-
ton, South Carolina, that your client, Alex Ray Bailey, was charged 
with trafficking cocaine there in 1984, and in fact was convicted in 
September, 1985 in absentia. Warrants based upon this have been on 
file at the Montgomery County Detention Center. In order to facilitate 
the South Carolina authorities in their efforts to enroll and execute 
their sentence, I have decided to enter a nolle prosequi to criminal 
number 41284. Your client will then be held under the South Carolina 
detainer and extradited. The State of Maryland does not intend to 
abandon its prosecution of Mr. Bailey, but we do feel that it would 
be appropriate for your client to personally answer these earlier charges 
in South Carolina and, if sentenced, to start serving his sentence 
there. I feel that that matter should be finally settled prior to the 
Montgomery County prosecution for the recent incident of February, 
1986. We would then bring your client back to Montgomery County 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. 
I will enter the nolle prosequi on Friday, June 6, 1986. 
[d. at 400, 572 A.2d at 547. 
62. [d. On June 9, 1986, Bailey's counsel responded by letter to the State's 
Attorney's office objecting to the procedure, and reiterating Bailey's previously 
requested demand for speedy trial. [d. at 400-01, 572 A.2d at 548. 
63. [d. at 401, 572 A.2d at 548. 
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cocaine importation. In July 1987, the State filed a request under 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers64 to obtain Bailey for trial in 
Maryland and set a pickup date of August 18, 1987. Bailey fought 
extradition, and did not appear in Montgomery County until Novem-
ber 25, 1987. 
After a trial date of December 8, 1987, was cancelled because 
of a conflict in the defense attorney's calendar, the case was reset 
for February 18, 1988. On February 17, the defendant filed a motion 
to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. The motion was denied and the 
trial proceeded on February 23, 1988. The jury found Bailey not 
guilty on the importation charge and guilty on the possession charge.6s 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the lower 
court's conviction in an unreported decision,66 holding that Bailey's 
right to a speedy trial had been denied. Petitions by the State for a 
writ of certiorari and the defendant's conditional cross-petition were 
granted, and the case was certified to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. The court of appeals was to determine whether the court 
of special appeals committed error in its determination of the relevant 
period by which to measure the length of the delay, and whether 
Bailey was denied his right to a speedy trial even if dismissal of the 
previous indictment did not toll the relevant period for speedy trial 
purposes.67 
The court of appeals upheld the original conviction, finding that 
the time delay between the arrest and the trial did not violate Bailey's 
right to a fair and speedy trial. Since the delay was over two years 
long, however, it was of constitutional dimension,68 thus triggering 
an analysis of the remaining factors established by Barker. The court 
applied the four-part Barker balancing test and determined that the 
unique circumstances involved were sufficient to outweigh any prej-
udice that may have resulted from the delay. 69 
IV. REASONING AND ANALYSIS 
The court reasoned that the prosecuting attorney's use of dis-
cretion in entering the nolle prosequi was in good faith, and Bailey 
suffered no actual prejudice as a result of the actions of the prose-
cution. 70 The court looked at the question of prejudice, considering 
the three interests which the constitutional guarantee was designed 
64. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 616A-616S (1992). 
65. Bailey v. State, 319 Md. 392, 401-02, 572 A.2d 544, 548 (1990). 
66. Bailey v. State, No. 88-737 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989). 
67. Bailey, 319 Md. at 408, 572 A.2d at 551. 
68. [d. at 411, 572 A.2d at 553. 
69. [d. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557. 
70. [d. 
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to protect, and found no evidence that Bailey's defense had been 
impaired or that he had suffered any anxiety, concern, or was 
otherwise prejudiced while incarcerated or awaiting prosecution.7) 
Even though the court assumed that the, delay of over two years 
from arrest to trial was attributable entirely to the State,72 the court 
of appeals concluded that Bailey was not denied his right to a speedy 
trial. 73 
To properly analyze the court's reasoning in Bailey, it would be 
instructive to examine it in light of prior applications of the Barker 
test. The court in Bailey applied the Barker factors in the following 
order: 
1. The Defendant'S Assertion of His Right 
While most state courts and many lower federal courts had 
previously endorsed some form of demand/waiver rule,74 the Supreme 
Court in Barker expressly rejected any such rule that forced a 
defendant to demand a speedy trial as a condition precedent to 
consideration of the speedy trial right. 7s The Court did acknowledge, 
however, that "failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a 
defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. "76 
The court of appeals acknowledged that Bailey had adequately 
asserted his right to a speedy trial, even from the early trial stages.77 
71. Id. at 416-19, 572 A.2d at 555-57. 
72. Id. at 415, 572 A.2d at 555. 
73. Id. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557. Neither the court of appeals nor the court of 
special appeals made reference to Maryland's statutory provision for speedy 
trial adopted in 1971. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (1992); see also supra 
notes 46-54 and accompanying text. As previously mentioned, a postponement 
under this provision may be granted only upon a showing of "good cause." 
Id. Good cause will be found if the need to postpone outweighs any detriment 
to the public interest. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 229, 458 A.2d 480, 
484 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 
474 A.2d 514 (1984); see also Norton, supra note 50, at 461-67. This balancing 
test is applied by the hearing judge, and his decision will not be overturned 
absent abuse of discretion. Norton, supra note 50, at 462. Evidently, both 
appellate courts accepted that the nolle prosequi was for a legitimate reason 
and proceeded to implement and rely entirely on the Barker balancing test. 
74. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 524 & nn.20-22 (1972). While noting that 
most states recognized a "demand" rule, the Court acknowledged that eight 
states rejected it at that time: Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, New York, 
Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 524 n.21. 
75. Id. at 525. 
76. Id. at 532. 
77. Bailey, 319 Md. at 409, 572 A.2d at 552. The court stated: 
There is no dispute about Bailey's preservation of an assertion of his 
right to a speedy trial. As defense counsel told the judge at the hearing 
on the motion to dismiss: We are all in agreement that from day one, 
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Noting that this assertion was entitled to strong evidentiary weight 
in determining whether a defendant had been deprived of his right,78 
the court of appeals embraced the Supreme Court's reasoning that 
the strength of the defendant's assertions would be indicative of the 
personal prejudice he was experiencing. The more serious the depri-
vation of his right to a speedy trial, the more likely the defendant 
would complain.79 
2. The Length oj the Delay 
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mecha-
nism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, 
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into 
the balance."8o The period of delay, not in itself determinative of 
whether the right has been denied, is measured from the time of 
arrest or when formal charges are filed against the defendant. 81 
The court of appeals was willing to accept, for the purpose of 
their analysis, that the entire period from arrest to trial constituted 
delay attributable to the prosecution.82 Being only one part of the 
balancing test, the court did not consider a delay of this magnitude 
to weigh heavily enough against the State to tip the scales in the 
defendant's favor. 
3. The Reason jor the Delay 
The court of appeals recognized that, even though the prosecutor 
has the right to enter a nolle prosequi, he runs the risk that doing 
literally, from the date that I entered my appearance in the District 
Court he has iterated, reiterated, and reiterated his demand for a 
speedy trial. 
Id. at 401 nA, 572 A.2d at 548 nA. 
78. Id. at 409-10, 572 A.2d at 552 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32). 
79.Id. 
80. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
81. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971). 
82. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415, 572 A.2d 544, 555 (1990). The Maryland 
appellate courts differed primarily in how they regarded the significance of the 
length of the delay. Establishing the relevant time period was the focus of the 
court of special appeals' speedy trial determination. Id. at 405-07, 572 A.2d 
at 550-51 (quoting Bailey v. State, No. 88-737, slip op. at 1-7 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. Apr. 17, 1989». In reversing the circuit court, that court deemed three 
time periods to be significant. Bailey, 319 Md. at 405, 572 A.2d at 550 (quoting 
Bailey, No. 88-737, slip op. at 1-2). Central to its analysis was the time period 
from the dismissal of the original charges on June 6, 1986, until the reindictment 
on May 28, 1987. Bailey, 319 Md. at 406, 572 A.2d at 550 (quoting Bailey, 
No. 88-737, slip op. at 2-3). The court of special appeals was unwilling to 
accept that a nearly one-year delay after a nolle prosequi could ever be justified 
in order to obtain an enhanced punishment, noting that the evidence used to 
support the conviction two years later turned out to be no more than the same 
evidence that supported the initial indictment. Bailey, 319 Md. at 407, 572 
A.2d at 551 (quoting Bailey, No. 88-737, slip op. at 5-6). 
166 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
so might result in delay and denial of a speedy trial. 83 The court 
followed the Barker rationale that "[a] deliberate attempt to delay 
the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily 
against the government."84 
The State admitted that in dismissing charges they sought two 
advantages: (1) to develop an enhanced case of importation of a 
controlled dangerous substance against the defendant, and (2) to 
allow South Carolina to enroll a conviction in absentia, thus allowing 
Bailey to begin serving his time as a South Carolina prisoner. 8S 
Although the Court in Barker decries the impropriety of such tactics 
by prosecutors, such behavior is only a factor to be considered in 
the balancing analysis and is not determinative of whether the right 
to a speedy trial has been violated.86 In balancing the factors, the 
court of appeals evidently considered the prosecutor's reasons for 
delay in bringing Bailey to trial less egregious than the intermediate 
appellate court below. 
4. Prejudice to the Defendant 
Reasoning that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice is not 
the sole determinant of denial of the constitutional right to a speedy 
trial, the Supreme Court in Barker assessed the degree of prejudice 
to the defendant in light of the three interests the right to speedy 
trial was designed to serve: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incar-
ceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) 
limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.s7 
83. Bailey, 319 Md. at 412,572 A.2d at 553. The court of special appeals, however, 
was much more concerned with the prosecutor's motives in dismissing the 
earlier charges and the potential detriment to the defendant's case. Although 
consistent with the court of appeals' reasoning that the State had the right to 
make this procedural move, the court of special appeals expressly rejected both 
of the State's reasons for the dismissal, accepting the defense's argument that 
the dismissal was clearly to gain a tactical advantage by the State. Bailey v. 
State, .No. 88-737, slip op. at 6 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 17, 1989). The 
court of special appeals reasoned that "[t]he evidence supporting the conviction 
and the evidence supporting the reindictment is the same evidence that supported 
the initial indictment. The nolle prosequi here was only for purposes of tactical 
delay, not for purposes of building a prima facie case." [d. 
84. Bailey, 319 Md. at 412, 572 A.2d at 553 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). 
85. [d. at 404, 572 A.2d at 549 (quoting the State's response to the motion to 
dismiss for lack of a speedy trial). 
86. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 & n.32. "We have indicated on previous occasions 
that it is improper for the prosecution intentionally to delay 'to gain some 
tactical advantage over [defendants] or to harass them.'" [d. at 531 n.32 
(quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971». 
87. [d. at 532 (citin~ United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966». 
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In Bailey's case, the first interest was not implicated since the 
majority of his incarceration prior to the Maryland trial was due to 
the previous conviction in South Carolina and not a result of the 
Maryland charges.88 There may have been some anxiety and concern 
on Bailey's part since he was aware, as forewarned by the prosecu-
tion, that he would face the Maryland charges sooner or later, but 
the court felt this to be insignificant under the circumstances. 89 His 
greatest concern might have been the prospect of serving his Maryland 
conviction consecutively with the South Carolina sentence, but this 
would seem a bit premature given the totality of the situation. 
The defense also claimed that the third interest of Bailey was 
violated in that his defense was impaired due to the loss of a potential 
witness.90 The unavailable testimony evidently would have pertained 
to the importation charge that was added upon Bailey's reindictment. 
Since the jury subsequently found Bailey not guilty on that charge, 
the court of appeals reasoned that it was obvious Bailey was not 
prejudiced by the witness's absence. 91 The defense also claimed "ac-
tual prejudice" to Bailey in that he was not allowed to enjoy a work 
. release program in the South Carolina jail and was kept in "lockdown 
status" due to the pending charges in Maryland.92 The court of 
appeals held that such a suggestion was merely speculative and 
unsupported by the evidence, and was to be given little weight in 
assessing the factor of prejudice.93 
While it is clear that the court of appeals looked to the Barker 
balancing test in considering whether Bailey's right to a speedy trial 
was denied, actual prejudice to the defendant was obviously the most 
important factor in their analysis. Lacking probative evidence that 
any significant prejudice actually resulted from the State's actions, 
the court was not convinced that Bailey was denied his constitutional 
guarantee. 
The defendant's remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial 
is dismissal of the indictment, a sanction previously depicted as 
"unsatisfactorily severe."94 The Supreme Court in Barker considered 
this a "serious consequence," possibly allowing a guilty defendant 
88. Bailey's time of incarceration in Maryland prior to the nolle prosequi and his 
return to South Carolina amounted to less than four months. Bailey, 319 Md. 
at 399-402, 572 A.2d at 547-48 (providing chronology of events). 
89. Id. at 417, 572 A.2d at 556. 
90. Brief of Respondent at 19-20, State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 
(1990) (No. 89-75). 
91. Bailey, 319 Md. at 419, 572 A.2d at 557. 
92. Id. at 417, 572 A.2d at 555-56; see also Brief of Respondent at 18, State v. 
Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 572 A.2d 544 (1990) (No. 89-75). 
93. Bailey, 319 Md. at 417, 572 A.2d at 556. 
94. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). 
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to go free without standing trial.9S While acknowledging it as more 
serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, the 
Court stressed that this "is the only possible remedy" when an 
accused has been deprived of the constitutional guarantee.96 By 
affirming Bailey's drug conviction after a two year delay, the court 
of appeals sends a strong message that it will not grant this "unsa-
tisfactorily severe" remedy unless a defendant can prove that even a 
delay of constitutional dimension was actually prejudicial. 
Although the court of appeal's analysis is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's balancing test in Barker, it represents somewhat of 
a departure from the court's earlier application of the test in Brady 
v. State. 97 In Brady, the court of appeals was quick to overturn a 
conviction where the State's reason for a fourteen month delay was 
more akin to negligence than malevolence. In a 4-3 split decision, 
the court held that the State's indifference to Brady's whereabouts 
was the most important factor in a balancing analysis that revealed 
minimal prejudice to the defendant. 
As characterized by the Brady dissent, the majority's decision 
to overturn Brady's conviction was primarily motivated by "disgust 
with the fact that we do not live in a perfect world where one may 
know at any given moment precisely who is incarcerated in Mary-
land."98 This suggests that the majority intended to send a message 
to prosecutors that such negligence on the part of the State would 
not be tolerated and tips the scales in favor of defendants even when 
a. clear showing of prejudice is lacking. Since the only remedy for 
denial of the speedy trial right is dismissal,99 the Brady court's 
decision to invoke this severe remedy was also a decision to send 
this message emphatically. 
The court in Bailey, however, indicated that this strict sanction 
should be reserved for those instances where ari individual has actually 
suffered harm from the delay. The court found no actual prejudice 
and accepted the State's obvious attempt to gain a tactical advantage 
and a longer delay, attaching minimal significance to any prejudice 
Bailey may have suffered. This strongly suggests that the court now 
considers the reasons for delay less significant than whether any real 
95. [d. 
96. [d. The Court quoted Justice White who had noted in an earlier case that 
overzealous application of the remedy would infringe "the societal interest in 
trying people accused of crime, rather than granting them immunization because 
of legal error .... " /d. at 522 n.16 (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 
116, 121 (1966». 
97. 291 Md. 261,434 A.2d 574 (1981); see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying 
text. 
98. Brady, 291 Md. at 274, 434 A.2d at 581 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
99. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
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prejudice has resulted. Absent a showing of actual prejudice, the 
court of appeals now appears reluctant to overturn convictions even 
when delays are of significant duration. 
One commentator has suggested that dismissal for a violation 
of the right to a speedy trial should only occur when the defendant's 
ability to defend himself is impaired by the delay. 100 The Supreme 
Court's opinion in Barker lends support to this suggestion by noting 
that of the three interests that the speedy trial right is designed to 
protect, possible impairment to the accused's defense is the most 
serious. 101 The court in Bailey noted this and, although not expressly 
stating that impairment was an absolute prerequisite to a finding of 
prejudice, was apparently satisfied that the absence of impairment 
in Bailey's case was proof that no prejudice resulted.102 
The Brady dissent, joined by Judges Murphy and Rodowsky, 
emphasized that an impaired defense was not implicated in Brady's 
situation. When asked if the delay in any way damaged the defen-
dant's ability to defend himself, Brady's counsel replied that "[n1o 
claim is made to that point of prejudice."lo3 These same judges, now 
part of the Bailey majority, likewise were not convinced that Bailey's 
defense was impaired by the State's delay, and were unwilling to 
allow Bailey to walk free. 
Considering the Supreme Court's recognition that delay at times 
may even work to the defendant's advantage,I04 it appears that the 
Maryland high court's decision to invoke the remedy only where the 
defense is actually impaired is more in harmony with the purpose of 
the constitutional protection. Judge Cole, who wrote both the ma-
jority opinion in Brady and the dissent in Bailey, is correct in his 
assessment that the court of appeals has departed from its application 
of the test in Brady. It is certainly arguable, however, that this more 
narrow application of the Barker test provides more protection to 
the general populace of Maryland by "secur[ing] rights to a defen-
dant" while not "preclud[ing] the rights of public justice." lOS As 
100. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 
STAN. L. REv. 525, 534-35 (1975). The author suggests that "the primary form 
of judicial relief against denial of a speedy trial should be to expedite trial, 
not to abort it." [d. at 535. 
101. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). The Court noted that "the inability 
of the defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire 
system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. 
There is also prejudice if defense witnesses· are unable to recall accurately 
events of the distant past." [d. 
102. State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 417, 572 A.2d 544, 556 (1990). 
103. Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 273, 434 A.2d 574, 580 (1981) (Smith, J., 
dissenting) . 
1.04. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521. 
105. [d. at 522 (quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905». 
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such, the departure is an improvement over the result reached by the 
Brady majority. 
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that no one factor 
alone is either necessary or sufficient to find that a defendant's rights 
have been violated 106 and an affirmative demonstration of prejudice 
is not absolutely necessary to prove a denial of the speedy trial 
right. 107 Maryland's current analysis, however, seems to indicate that 
proof of actual prejudice, though not dispositive, is of greater 
importance than any other factor in the balancing test. While the 
other factors are still considered in the overall balancing process, 
future defendants in Maryland will likely have to provide a strong 
showing of actual prejudice in order to establish denial of the right 
to a speedy trial. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland appears to have 
shifted somewhat in their assignment of relative weights to the four 
factors employed in a speedy trial analysis, the decision in Bailey 
follows the premise of the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo: speedy 
trial claims are evaluated on an ad hoc basis, and no single factor 
is dispositive of denial of the right. While important in the overall 
analysis, the length of the delay serves primarily as a mechanism 
which triggers application of a balancing test to determine whether 
the right to a speedy trial was violated. 
While the Maryland courts continue to rely on the Barker 
balancing test, proof of actual prejudice to the defendant is the 
determining factor in successfully overturning a conviction subsequent 
to a pre-trial delay. As the courts take a harder look at whether an 
accused has suffered any actual prejudice, the defense must produce 
convincing evidence of that prejudice to tip the scales in their favor. 
In particular, a showing that the delay has impaired the accused's 
ability to present his defense is considered most probative of actual 
prejudice. 
Joseph W. Rasnic 
106. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. 
107. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973). 
